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SOME

PROHIBITION FORFEITURE CASES--THE
DOCTRINE OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY'
FORREST R. BLACK

On March 30, 1920 the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia decided three cases, 2 Burks, J., speaking for the court in
each case, thereby establishing an unenviable record in the field
of vicarious liability that we trust will never be repeated by any
other commonwealth. Each case was submitted on an agreed
statement of facts. In each case the automobile used in the illegal
transportation of intoxicating liquor was forfeited, although the
interveners were innocent and free from fault. In Buchholz v.
Commonwealth the owner of the car (Mr. Buchholz, a hotel
owner in the District of Columbia) instructed his chauffeur to
take the car to a repair shop in the District. The chauffeur violated the owner's instructions and drove into Virginia and was
later arrested in Richmond, Virginia, charged with the illegal
transportation of ardent spirits. Under a statute of the District
of Columbia, the chauffeur became a thief before taking the car
from the District, whether the right given the'chauffeur by the
owner was that of custody or possession. The Virginia court disregarded the District of Columbia statute and declared that:
. ..the important inquiry is, Did the owner entrust his
car to Chisholm [the chauffeur] ? If he did, he must bear
the consequences of his misplaced confidence. It is3 immaterial whether Chisholm had custody or possession".
The court also said:
"There are many nice distinctions between custody and
possession, applicable chiefly in the administration of the
criminal law where they have been practically eliminated by
'This is c. IV of a book soon to be published under the general title "Ill-

Starred Prohibition Cases".
'Buchholz v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. 794, 1O2 S. E. 76o (192o) ; Pennington
v. Commonwealth, 127 Va. 803, iO2 S. E. 758 (i92o); King v. Commonwealth,
z27 Va.
8oo, IO2 S. E. 757 (1920).
3
Buchholz v. Commonwealth, supra note 2, at 797, i02 N. E. at 761.
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the statutes on embezzlement, but we do not regard
them as
4
applicable to the statute under consideration".
In Pennington v. Commonwealth the agreed statement of
facts showed that Pennington was engaged in the general automobile for hire business in Augusta, Georgia; that he had purchased the car that was later forfeited; that one Ricker had loaned
Pennington $21oo for the purchase of the same; that he (Ricker)
took a lien thereon and recorded the same; and that no part of
the $21oo had been paid him. Pennington rented the car in question to one John Allen for the purpose of delivering books in
the state of Georgia, with the express understanding and agreement that the car was not to be taken outside the state of Georgia. Pennington had no knowledge that the car was to be used
for an illegal purpose or was to be taken outside of the state
until he learned of its seizure in the state of Virginia. The court
held that the car could be forfeited and that the innocent parties,
Pennington and Ricker, must suffer. The court said:
"We are not concerned with the fact that there was a
breach of bailment on the part of Allen.

.

.

. The question

is, how did Allen acquire possession from the owner? Was
it with his consent? Did the owner intrust him with the
car? If so, then the owner must suffer the consequences
of his misplaced confidence". 5
The final case in this trilogy, crowning one glorious day of
judicial effort on the part of the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia, is King v. Commonwealth. Here, under an agreed
statement of facts, King, the intervener, held a lien for unpaid
purchase money in the amount of $55o, duly recorded prior to
the seizure. He sold the car to one Marinosci, and the automobile was in charge of the purchaser at the time of seizure. King
had no knowledge that the car was being illegally used. The
court held that the innocent lienor was not protected.
In order to appreciate the significance of these three Virginia
cases, we desire at this point to make some general observations.
'Ibid.
5
Pennington v. Commonwealth, mtpra note 2, at 8o6, io2 N. E. at 759.
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These cases illustrate in a striking manner the doctrine of vicarious liability. Each case was submitted on an agreed statement
of facts, and there is no question of the innocence of the owners
or lienors. There is no room for any presumptions of bad faith
or knowledge. Each case presents a clear record of an innocent
party being punished because of some innate judicial feeling that
thereby the "noble experiment" might succeed. It is the same
urge that too often dominates enforcing officers and courts to
initiate and defend lawless enforcement of the prohibition laws
generally.
But, it may be said, why criticise th judges? The legislature of Virginia has laid down the drastic policy of forfeiture.
If there is to be any blame, place it at the door of the legislature,
where it rightly belongs. We believe this contention is unsound,
for the reason that the court misinterpreted the Virginia statute.6
In every one of these three cases the court cited with approval
the case of Landers v. Commonwealth,7 decided by the same
court in November, i919. In this case the court construed
the Virginia Prohibition Act in such a way as to sacrifice the
rights of innocent owners and lienors. Under such an interpretation they have emasculated that provision of the statute which
requires that "all persons concerned in interest be cited to appear
and show cause why the said property should not be condemned
and sold to enforce the forfeiture. . . . " Why did not Buchholz, under a fair interpretation of the statute, have the right to
defeat the forfeiture of the automobile being driven by a thief?
If forfeitures are to be strictly construed as against the state, is
there any justification for the court's distinction between a technical thief and an out-and-out thief? Disregarding the effect of
the District of Columbia statute, at common law the chauffeur
who converted to his own use the automobile of the master, after
it had been put in his charge by the master, was guilty of a felony,
and to make such a conversion larceny the felonious intent need
not have existed in the servant's mind at the time of receiving
'Va. Laws 1918, C. 388, §57, amended by VA.
§ 4675 (28).
'126 Va. 780, 1ot S. E. 778 (IMs9).

CODE Axh.

(1924)

SOME PROHIBITION FORFEITURE CASES

the property into his charge. 8 Why should not the case at bar
be covered by that provision of the statute that gives to the owner
the right to "appear and show cause why the said property should
not be condemned and sold to enforce*the forfeiture"?
Contrast the harsh construction of this Virginia court with
that of the federal court in the case of United States v. Brockley.
The National Prohibition Act 10 expressly protects the rights of
an innocent lienor, but says nothing as to the protection of the
interests of an innocent owner. The court in this case construed
the federal statute in a liberal manner so as to protect the innocent owner. We suspect that, in the case above, the Virginia court,
with its emphasis centered on prohibition enforcement, would
have sacrificed the innocent owner by construing the statute literally. There are two methods of approach in a forfeiture case,
where the statute is somewhat equivocal; and the court is free to
accept either alternative. It may assume the attitude of the Virginia court and stress the idea that the action is in rem; that the
property itself is the offender and that as soon as the "guilty"
chattel is found the matter is settled. On the other hand, the
court may follow what might be characterized as the federal attitude, that chattels per se (at least in prohibition cases) do not
offend, and that forfeiture proceedings are in substance criminal
proceedings " and justified, if at all, as penalties necessarily
inflicted on the owner. This leads to a strict construction as
against the government. The former approach smacks of the
common law deodand and the noxal liability of the Roman law.' 2
The latter approach protects the admittedly innocent, and has
behind it a respectable tradition of two hundred and fifty years
in the evolution of the common law. In a case in 1672, Vaughan,
C. J. said:

'State v. Schingen, 20 Wis. 74 (1865). There are early authorities to the
effect that the master is conceived to be in possession of goods entrusted to the
servant, only so long as the servant is in the master's house, or with the master.
Y. B. 21 Hen. VII, 17 (i5o6); WARREN, CASES ON PROPERTY (abridged ed.
1915) 6o.
'266 Fed. I001 (M. D. Pa. I920).
1041 STAT. 315 (I9M9), 27 U. S. C. §40 (1928).

u Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (1886).
" HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (909) 7 et seq., 17 et seq.
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. goods, as goods, cannot offend, forfeit, unlade, pay

3
duties, or the like, but men whose goods they are".'

It should be of interest at this point to trace the evolution of
the federal rule with reference to forfeiture in prohibition cases.
One significant fact will emerge, and that is that the trend in the
federal courts is away from the harshness of the Virginia doctrine. There are two federal statutes under which automobiles
may be forfeited. One is a revenue statute, 14 the other is the prohibition statute.' 5 There are several differences in the wording of
the two sections.
(a) Section 26 of the prohibition statute protects the innocent lienor expressly and the owner by implication.' 6 Section
3450 of the revenue statute does not protect the innocent owner
or lienor except in case of theft or trespass without the owner's
knowledge.'

7

(b) Section 26 is not applicable when the car is at a standstill, as the word "transportation" contemplates locomotion or
movement.

Section 3450 is not so restricted.' 8

(c) Section 26 requires a conviction of the driver of the
offending automobile before the forfeiture machinery can be set
in motion. If the driver escapes Section 3450 is still applicable.
(d) Section 26 provides for the return of the property
seized upon the execution of "a good and valid bond with sufficient sureties". This procedure is not authorized under Section
3450.

(e) The sections differ as to method of sale. Section 26
provides that "the court upon conviction of the person so arrested
shall order the liquor destroyed, and unless good cause to the contrary is shown by the owner, shall order a sale". Section 3450
' Shepard v. Gosnold, Vaughan I59, 172 (Eng. 1672).
REv. STAT. § 3450 (1878), 26 13. S. C. § 1182 (Supp. 1928).

14

s Supra note io.
'sSupranote 9.
7
' United States v. One Ford Coupe, 21 F. (2d) 639 (S. D. Idaho 1927);
United States v. One Buick Roadster, 28o Fed. 517 (D. Mont. 1922).
'For a general discussion of distinctions between the two sections, see
Buckley, Forfeiture of Vehicles for Unlawful Movement of Liquor: Under the

National ProhibitionAct-Under the Revised Statutes (924) 4 B. U. L. REv. 183.
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provides for arbitrary forfeiture of any auto found with the
goods; claims of ownership and lack of knowledge notwithstanding.
(f) Finally, Section 3450 covers the case where the automobile is being used for the removal, deposit and concealment
of goods, upon which there is a revenue tax, with intent to defraud the government, and provides for forfeiture. Section 26
protects innocent parties.' 9
Immediately upon the passage of Section 26 the following
queries arose: (i) Does Section 26 repeal Section 3450 so far
as prohibition cases are concerned? (2) Does the government
have an election as between Sections 26 and 3450? (3)If Section 3450 is applicable, to what extent can it be used?
The federal courts for a considerable time groped blindly,
and it is possible to find an authority for almost every possible
interpretation. In Payne v. United States 2 0 the court held that
the revenue act is to be enforced so long as it does not conflict
with the prohibition act. The revenue act is not repealed but is
only suspended, where the facts of a particular case bring the
matter under the prohibition act. Other courts held that the revenue act does not apply, and that all cases involving prohibition
fall under the prohibition law.2 1 The Supreme Court of the
United States, in the case of U. S. v. Yuginovich,2 2 held that
Section 35 of the prohibition act, providing that "all provisions of
law that are inconsistent with this act are repealed only to the
extent of the inconsistency", should be construed in the light of
the rule that later enactments repeal former ones practically covering the same field but fixing a lesser penalty. Several federal
courts, acting on the above decision, held that Section 345o had
been repealed by Section 26.23
"United States v. Sylvester, 273 Fed. 253 (D. Conn. I921).
1279 Fed. 112 (C. C. A. 5th, [922).
' One Ford Touring Car v. United States, 284 Fed. 823 (C. C. A. 8th,
22256 U. S. 450, 41 Sup. Ct. 55, (1921).

r922).

'United States v. One Haynes Auto, 274 Fed. 926 (C. C. A. 5th, 1921);
United States v. One Paige Auto, 277 Fed. 524 (S.D. Tex. 1922); Lewis v.
United States, 280 Fed. 5 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922) ; McDowell v. United States, 286
Fed. 521 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923).
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To cure the effect of the Yuginovich decision and to remove
the confusion in the federal courts, Congress passed the Willis
Campbell Act.2
".

4

Section 5 provides:

that all laws in regard to the manufacture and tax-

ation of and traffic in intoxicating liquor, and all penalties
for violations of such laws that were in force when the National Prohibition Act was enacted, shall be and continue in
force, as to both beverage and non-beverage liquor, except
such provisions of such laws as are directly in conflict with
any provision of the National Prohibition Act."
Here is a brilliant illustration of a clarifying act that does not
clarify. The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States since the passage of the Willis Campbell Act have not
been uniform. In United States v. One Ford Coupe 25 the court
held that, in view of Section 5 of the supplemental act (the Willis
Campbell Act), an implied repeal of Section 3450 by that act of
the National Prohibition Act (Section 26) could not result from
mere inconsistency, but must rest upon direct conflict. The court
held that both statutes are operative. If the proper facts constituting a cause of action under Section 3450 are alleged, forfeiture could be had under that act. Further, the court said that
Section 26 in its relation to the forfeiture of vehicles applies only
to cases incident to the prosecution of persons transporting liquor
in violation of that act, and does not protect innocent persons
whose vehicles are forfeited under Section 3450.
The next important case decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States, dealing with the interpretation of Sections 26
and 3450, is Port Gardner Co. v. United States.2 6 The court
held that the right to proceed under Section 3450 is lost, where the
government has already proceeded against and convicted the driver
of the vehicle on the charge of illegal possession and transportation. A similar view was expressed by the court in Commercial
Credit Co. v. United States,2 7 in which the court held that the
42 STAT. 223

(1921), 27 U. S. C. §3 (Supp. 1928).

47 Sup. Ct. '54 (1926).
U. S. 564, 47 Sup. Ct. 165 (1926).
1276 U. S. 226, 48 Sup. Ct. 232 (1928).
272
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U. S.
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automobile containing liquor must be disposed of under Section
26, where the driver was convicted of unlawful possession incidental to transportation.
It should be noted that the tendency of the Supreme Court
in both the Port Gardnerand Commercial Credit Company cases
is to accept the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in the
case of United States v. One Ford Coupe.28 His opinion has become so important that we quote at length:
"I agree that the Willis-Campbell Act requires section
3450 of the Revised Statutes and Section 26 of the National
Prohibition law to be so construed as to stand together
insofar as they are not in direct conflict. I agree also that
there conceivably may be a deposit or concealment of illicit
liquor in an automobile with intent to defraud the United
States of the tax upon it, which is not transportation within
the meaning of Section 26, and to that extent the two sections are not in conflict. But I cannot subscribe to those
expressions in the opinion which seem to suggest that the
two sections are not in direct conflict in a case where there
is transportation of liquor in a vehicle in violation of the
National Prohibition law with intent to defraud the United
States of the tax. In that case section 26, it seems to me,
plainly directs that the seizure shall be made and proceedings
for forfeiture of the seized vehicle had under that section.
In that event section 26 saves the interest of the innocent
owner or lienor from the forfeiture required by section 3450.
It appears to me that the conflict in such a case is direct and
that section 26 by its terms is controlling."
The Supreme Court of the United States has thereby committed
itself to a liberal construction of the forfeiture statutes in favor
of innocent parties. In interpreting Sections 26 and 3450 the
highest court in the land has taken a position that reduces to a
minimum the chance of vicarious liability.
There are four states that follow the harsh Virginia doctrine. In order to show how far the vicarious liability principle
has travelled, we desire to discuss briefly one case from each of
these four jurisdictions; namely, South Dakota, Kansas, Nebraska and Arkansas.
I Slepra note 25,

at 335, 47 Sup. Ct. at 159.
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In the case of State v. One Studebaker Automobile2 9 the
court construed the state statute in such a manner that the rights
of the innocent mortgagee were forfeited. A South Dakota
statute 30 provides that, in case of the transportation of intoxicating liquor in an automobile or other vehicle, the automobile
or other vehicle so used shall be forfeited and "unless good cause
is shown to the contrary by the owner" the same shall be sold
by the sheriff of the county. The court construed this strictly
so as to protect only the innocent owner. The court said:
"Indeed there can be no such thing as an innocent
holder of a chattel mortgage on an automobile since the
enactment of Chap. 204 Laws 1925. The law plainly declares that an automobile used for the purpose of transporting intoxicating liquor is a public nuisance, and shall be
31
forfeited".
The appellant contended that:
. .. forfeitures are not favored in law, and a statute will
not be construed to have that effect unless from the statute
itself, in the light of its object and the existing conditions,
it is manifest that the Legislature so intended, and the rule
especially applies with reference to forfeitures of property
32
of innocent persons".
How did the court answer this contention? It held that to protect the innocent mortgagee would be placing a strained interpretation on the law, and, then, in order to bolster up its decision,
the court introduced into the discussion the "public nuisance"
doctrine, an expression that is not even mentioned in the statute. 3
The Kansas case is State v. Peterson.34 The question there
was whether a holder in good faith of a mortgage on an auto'So S. D. 408, 21o N. W. 194 (1926).
' S. D. Rav. CODE (1919) § 1O,3O3, amended by S. D. Laws 1925, C.204.
"Sqpra note 29, at 412, 210 N. W. at i96. (Italics are the author's.)
'Ibid.
" Zll7
The federal courts have adopted the opposite construction and have protected the innocent owner, although only the innocent lienor was expressly mentioned in the National Prohibition Act. See Note (1927) 25 MicH. L. REV. 659.
'io7 Kan. 641, 193 Pac. 342 (1920).
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mobile was entitled to have his lien satisfied out of the proceeds
of a sale, under the provisions of a forfeiture statute a' declaring
an automobile used in the transportation of intoxicating liquors
to be a common nuisance. There was no question of the innocence of the mortgagee. The court construed the statute so as
to sacrifice the innocent mortgagee's interest. The appellant's
argument that such a construction is bad policy, because it destroys the security of mortgages, which in these days of large
credit transactions it is the policy of the law to protect, was repudiated because the court felt that the legislature clearly intended
to sacrifice the innocent mortgagee's interest. The court further
dismissed the due process contention by stating that the statute
was within the police power of the state and "the purpose of the
sale and forfeiture was to make certain the abatement of the
nuisance, and to promote the morals and health of the people". 36
37
An extreme case from Nebraska is Sandlovich v. Hawes.
The plaintiff was engaged in the business of renting automobiles
for hire. One Tucker, who rented the car from the plaintiff,
used it for unlawfully transporting liquor. The plaintiff was
admittedly innocent. The court held that he could not recover
under a forfeiture statute that declared a car so used to be a common nuisance. Similar statutes in South Carolina and Alabama
have been construed so as to protect innocent parties.38
In the Arkansas case of White Auto Co. v. Collins 3
another type of innocent party was mowed down by the vicious
doctrine of vicarious liability. The appellant, the seller of an
automobile, delivered possession to the buyer but retained title
until payments had been made in full. The buyer illegally transported liquor in the car. The court held that the innocent conditional vendor had no protection under the forfeiture statute.
It has been estimated that financing companies in the automobile
"KAx. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) C. 21, § 2162.
Supra note 34, at 647, 193 Pac. at 344.
1I3 Neb. 374, 203 N. W. 541 (,925).

'State v. Hughes, 203 Ala. go, 82 So. r04 (igig) ; Maples v. State, 2o3
Ala. 153, 82 So. 183 (1919); Moody v. McKinney, 73 S. C. 438, 53 S.E. 543
(igo6).
09i36 Ark. 8I, 2o6 S.W. 748 (igz8).
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field, retaining title until all the payments have been made, actually
participate in three-fourths of the annual four million sales transactions involving automobiles. The financial operations are estimated at two billion dollars annually. 40 Here is a legitimate
business that is being unduly imposed upon and being forced to
act at its peril, in order that a drastic prohibition enforcement policy may be carried out.
On what sound theory of social policy can the property rights
of persons who have no knowledge of the unlawful use of their
property be forfeited, justifiably? It is contended by some that
it is necessary to forfeit property rights of innocent parties in
order to enforce the prohibition laws. The proponents of this
theory will argue that, if the property rights of parties innocent
of the wrongful use of their property are not forfeited, it will
open the door to collusion and afford a ready means of evading
the law. It is said that any person desiring to engage in the
illegal transportation of liquor could, by placing an encumbrance
upon an automobile, minimize the financial investment and the
hazard of the business. This is no doubt true, but it does not
follow that effective enforcement of the prohibition laws indispensably requires that the innocent shall suffer by the imposition
of the doctrine of vicarious liability. The man who desires to
engage in the illegal transportation of liquor can purchase outright a second-hand car that will involve a very limited financial
investment. One successful "haul" will net a profit sufficient to
cover the original outlay. We contend that wherever possible
the courts should place a construction on forfeiture statutes such
as will protect the property rights of innocent parties, and then,
as a safeguard, place the burden upon the person who claims to
be innocent to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence that he is
in fact innocent. By such a construction the property rights of
innocent parties are not destroyed, while the property rights of
the guilty are forfeited. The law has accomplished its proper
object-justice. Under the present situation in five of our states
the apparent object is enforcement at any price.
'1

New York Times, Feb.

21, 1928,

at 7.
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Another vicious theory sometimes advanced is that an automobile, while being illegally used, is a common nuisance. The
term "common nuisance" is a very general and abstract term.
What the law should really aim to do is to punish the wrongful
user. It certainly cannot be said that an automobile is unlawful
per se because the very nature of the vehicle is admirably adapted
to a quick "get away". If justice is to be maintained, the enforcement of prohibition should be restricted to the punishment of
wrong-doers.
How far will the proponents of vicarious liability carry their
doctrine, in the hope that thereby they will achieve an effective
enforcement of the prohibition laws? After one has accepted
their fundamental premise, there should be no difficulty in extending the doctrine (under "common nuisance" statutes) to the
case where the owner is using his own car and is innocent, although liquor is found in the car. Suppose that, through malicious motive or as a practical joke, a person should buy a dozen
bottles, and, after placing a quantity of intoxicating liquor in each,
should place one of the bottles in each of the first dozen cars
that he found parked on any city street. The next step would be
to notify the prohibition enforcement unit. The prohibition
sleuths would thus be afforded an admirable opportunity for improving their enforcement record. With a minimum of risk,
they would simply stand by until their prey arrived. When the
innocent owner attempted to drive the car away, he would be
apprehended, the car would be searched, and a seizure and forfeiture would follow.
It will not do to waive aside this hypothetical case by characterizing it as fanciful, absurd, and impossible. Soon after the
case of Carroll v. United States41. was decided, the writer predicted 42 that the doctrine of that case would inevitably lead to the
killing of many innocent motorists. At the time of utterance
that prediction may have seemed absurd to some. Today we
know that there have been scores '3 of legalized murders of inno"x267 U.

S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. 280 (,925).

"Black, The Curse of the CarrollCase, qThe Minute Man, Aug.
I

Chicago Tribune, Sept. 25, 1927.

22,

x926.
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cent motorists, in connection with which the prohibition enforcement unit has found aid and comfort in the dbctrine of the Car4

roll Case. "

No specious plea of difficulty of enforcement should ever
justify the recognition of the doctrine that the end justifies the
means. Far better that the guilty go free than punish the innocent.
"The damnable character of the bootlegger business
should not close our eyes to the mischief which will surely
follow any attempt to destroy it by unwarranted methods.
'To press forward to a great principle by breaking through
every other great principle that stands in the way of its
establishment .

.

. in short, to procure an eminent good

by means that are unlawful, is as little consonant to private
morality as to public justice' ".4
"See Black, A Critiqtw of ttw Carroll Case (1929) 29 CoL. L. Rav. io6S.
" MeReynolds, J., dissenting, in Carroll v. United States, supra note 41, at
163, 45 Sup. Ct. at 288.

